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T
his paper serves as an intro-
duction to the ﬁfth in a series of
Colloquia under the general title
“In the Light of Evolution” (ILE;
see Box 1). Papers from the ﬁrst four
colloquia in the “In the Light of Evolu-
tion” series, titled “Adaptation and
Complex Design,” “Biodiversity and
Extinction,” “Two Centuries of Darwin,”
and “The Human Condition,” are refs.
1–4, respectively. The current volume
explores recent developments in the
study of cooperation and conﬂict, ranging
from the level of the gene to societies
and symbioses.
Any student of history knows that hu-
mans can be a vicious lot, but paradox-
ically, we are also among nature’s great
cooperators. Which of us, as an individual,
can manufacture a cell phone or an air-
plane? Even our great conﬂicts—wars—
are extremely cooperative endeavors on
each side. Some of this cooperation is
best understood culturally, but we are
also products of evolution, with bodies,
brains, and behaviors molded by natural
selection. How cooperation evolves has
been one of the big questions in evolu-
tionary biology, and how it pays or does
not pay is a great intellectual puzzle.
If nothing makes sense in biology except
in the light of evolution (5), then for the
ﬁrst century after Darwin, cooperation and
altruism did not make much sense. We
could see that individual organisms some-
times helped others, even at a cost to their
own ﬁtness. It was clear that such behavior
could beneﬁt the group, population, spe-
cies, or even other species and whole
communities. However, it was not obvious
how such effects would be heritable. All
our mathematical models—the hard work
of the modern synthesis—were about in-
dividuals with one allele out-reproducing
those with an alternative. This process
would favor individuals with higher re-
production but would not be expected to
produce self-sacriﬁce. However, apparent
cooperation was routinely attributed to the
good of the group, species, or community.
This situation changed in the ﬁrst decade
of Darwinism’s second century. Hamilton
(6, 7) argued that cooperation was im-
portant in nature and that social evolution
could be understood in terms of direct
gains to the actor’s own ﬁtness or indirect
beneﬁts to the ﬁtness of others who share
the cooperation allele. There followed an
intense period of exploring the indirect
effects of cooperation and altruism, re-
interpreting sexual selection and many
other phenomena in terms of individual
advantage, and understanding frequency-
dependent effects through game theory,
efforts that continue to the present.
The puzzle of cooperation was the
dominant theme of research in the early
years, whereas recent work has empha-
sized its importance and ubiquity. Far
from being a rare trait shown by social
insects and a few others, cooperation is
both widespread taxonomically and
essential to life. Major transitions in the
hierarchy of life have often involved co-
operation among lower-level units to the
point where they evolve into higher-level
organisms (8, 9). Examples include the
assembly of the eukaryotic cell with its
symbiotic organelles, the evolution of
multicellular organisms, and the organis-
mal colonies of some social insects. Or-
ganisms are, at multiple levels, those units
that have evolved to have, within their
boundaries, extreme cooperation and
minimal conﬂict (10, 11). The depth of
research on cooperation and conﬂict has
increased greatly, most notably in the di-
rection of the small organisms. Microbes
turn out to have highly developed co-
operation (12), and they, along with
other model organisms, have proven in-
strumental in beginning to understand
sociality at the genetic and molecular
levels, the study of real selﬁsh genes (13).
The social evolution approach has given
us insights on diseases often caused by
microbes (14). At the other end of the
spectrum, we are getting a much better
understanding of the cooperation and
conﬂict that matters most to our species
(15). Cooperation has been central to
humanity’s spectacular success and will be
central to our short- and long-term fates.
Fundamentals of Evolutionary
Cooperation
Although most of this volume is about the
new topics that are being treated as part
of social evolution, such as genes, mi-
crobes, and medicine, the old funda-
mental topics still matter and remain the
subject of vigorous research. The ﬁrst four
papers in these proceedings revisit some
of these standard arenas, including so-
cial insects, cooperatively breeding
birds, mutualisms, and models of social
evolution.
There are many ways to think about
and model social evolution. Inclusive ﬁt-
ness is one of the most venerable and most
useful, and it is the framework used by
many works in this volume. Queller (16)
revisits why inclusive ﬁtness has been so
useful and suggests ways to expand it to
speak more directly to interactions besides
kin selection. He delimits two other kinds
of social selection that can be treated
more explicitly in Hamilton’s rule (6, 7).
Kind selection, which involves synergisms
between individuals expressing the same
traits, groups together greenbeards
(genes that, in effect, can identify the
presence of copies of themselves in
other individuals) and many cases of
frequency-dependent games. They share
the feature that individuals expressing
the trait have different effects on other
expressers compared with nonexpressers,
and they also share many differences
from pure kin selection. Kith selection
requires neither kin nor kind, but instead
involves actors affecting partners in ways
that feed back to the actor’s ﬁtness. Mu-
tualism and manipulation are included in
this category. The expanded version of
Hamilton’s rule with kin, kith, and kind
could bring the advantages of Hamilton’s
methods to a broader range of social in-
teractions (6, 7).
Interactions between individuals of
different species are a major type of kith
selection, where individuals are selected
to affect their partners in ways that ulti-
mately beneﬁt themselves (or their kin).
Such interactions need not be cooperative,
but when they are, they typically involve
exchange of different services that one
partner needs and the other can easily
provide; therefore, partners can be very
different. Accordingly, Sachs et al. (17)
explore associations or symbiosis among
partners that are very different indeed,
one being eukaryotic and the other being
prokaryotic. Such symbioses, by leading
to mitochondria and chloroplasts, were
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responsible for the evolution of the eu-
karyotic cell itself. However, additional
symbioses are widespread and sometimes
ancient. Sachs et al. (17) use a combina-
tion of broad-scale phylogenetic analyses
and case histories of particular systems to
explore several transitions. They ﬁnd, for
example, that there is little phylogenetic
signal to indicate that some bacterial
groups are preadapted for eukaryotic
symbiosis (17). Instead, the genes required
seem to be quite widely available through
horizontal transmission. Mutualistic inter-
actions seem to arise from both parasitic
and free-living ancestors. Once acquired,
these mutualistic interactions seem to be
quite stable, with few reversions to non-
mutualistic forms. Given the tendency of
vertically transmitted symbionts to de-
grade and the propensity of horizontally
transmitted ones to cheat, this stability is
somewhat surprising.
The social insects have long been
viewed as the pinnacle of cooperation.
This view is most tenable if one ignores the
cooperation that goes on in transitions
that are already complete, such as multi-
cellular animals or the eukaryotic cell.
However, some social insect colonies are
so cooperative and integrated that they are
viewed as superorganisms (organisms
made up of other organisms). The motive
force behind the evolution of these socie-
ties, which consist of close relatives, is
kin selection (6). Nonacs (18) points out
that predictions from kin selection theory
have been both successful and also disap-
pointing. The difference, he suggests, is
not because of chance. The successful
predictions from sex ratio theory and
worker-policing theory occur when the
predicted behaviors can be achieved using
simple environmental cues that correlate
with kinship. It is easy to treat males dif-
ferently from females or workers differ-
ently from queens. The less successful kin
selection predictions, such as parts of skew
theory, may fail because they require ge-
netic kin recognition mechanisms sufﬁ-
cient to detect closer from more distant
relatives within colonies. This may not
explain everything, because genetic kin
recognition systems do exist, at least for
distinguishing colony members from non-
colony members. The interaction between
environmental and genetic recognition
systems has scarcely been explored, and
Nonacs (18) runs computer simulations
showing how greenbeard loci can perturb
the outcomes expected under pedigree
relatedness alone.
After the social insects, cooperative
birds and mammals have attracted the
most attention. Many bird species have
helpers at the nest, usually offspring from
previous broods who have remained at
their natal site (19). Kinship is important
here as well. Helping systems usually
evolve from monogamous ones, and dis-
crimination evolves in systems that show
variation in relatedness (20). However,
the story is more complicated for two rea-
sons. First, although some helpers gain
kin-selected beneﬁts through helping close
kin, others may gain direct beneﬁts. Com-
pared with the social insects, more re-
search on birds has addressed the parti-
cular beneﬁts of remaining at home and
the ecological constraints that may limit
independent breeding. Variance in re-
productive success has played a role in
these discussions, but Rubenstein (21)
moves it to a more central position. He
suggests that cooperative breeders may
be bet hedgers, gaining advantage from a
more uniform reproductive output in coop-
erative groups. Rubenstein (21) draws on
many years of his ﬁeld data on starlings in
Africa, where there is much variation in
both time and space, and he ﬁnds support
for several predictions of this hypothesis.
Cooperation Writ Small: Microbes
Perhaps no taxa are as promising for en-
hancing both our understanding of co-
operation and our understanding of the
mechanisms as microbes. Early work on
microbes concentrated on purifying and
isolating them for growth in pure culture.
The postulates by Koch (22) required this
and were important for determining ex-
actly which microbes caused a particular
disease. However, in nature, microbes live
in complex multispecies structured envi-
ronments. Social interactions are pro-
found, because microbes perform many
functions (like digestion) extracellularly
that animals perform inside. One of the
recent transformative elements of the
study of microbes has been an apprecia-
tion of the importance of their social in-
teractions. Many of the types of social
interactions found in animals have their
counterparts in microbes. Some co-
operative interactions are much more
easily studied in microbes, particularly
if the goal is to illuminate the genetic
basis of behavior or use the power of
experimental evolution.
Perhaps the best-studied social bacte-
rium is Myxococcus xanthus, a species of
δ-proteobacteria that spends its entire life
in social groups (23). It is a predatory
bacterium that hunts other bacteria in so-
cial packs, dissolving its prey in pools of
cooperatively produced enzymes before
ingesting them. Movement usually is based
on Type IV pili and is fundamentally so-
cial. When food is scarce, individual bac-
teria aggregate into a fruiting body. In this
stalkless fruiting body, most or nearly all
cells lyse, perhaps to the beneﬁt of the
remaining few, which form hardy spores.
Experimental evolution has shown us
much about the nature of sociality in
M. xanthus. For example, when food was
patchily distributed, the species evolved
more efﬁcient group hunting techniques
(24). Under other circumstances, social
cheaters can drive population crashes
(23, 25). In one fascinating case, a new co-
operator evolved from the social cheater.
Box 1. In the Light of Evolution
In 1973, Dobzhansky (5) penned a short
commentary titled “Nothing in Biology
Makes Sense Except in the Light of
Evolution.” Most scientists agree that
evolution provides the unifying frame-
work for interpreting biological phe-
nomena that otherwise can often seem
unrelated and perhaps unintelligible.
Given the central position of evolution-
ary thought in biology, it is sadly ironic
that evolutionary perspectives outside
the sciences have often been neglected,
misunderstood, or purposefully mis-
represented. Biodiversity—the genetic
variety of life—is an exuberant product
of the evolutionary past, a vast human-
supportive resource (aesthetic, in-
tellectual, and material) of the present,
and a rich legacy to cherish and preserve
for the future. Two challenges (as well as
opportunities) for 21st century science
are to gain deeper insights into the
evolutionary processes that foster biotic
diversity and to translate that under-
standing into workable solutions for
the regional and global crises that bio-
diversity currently faces. A grasp of
evolutionary principles and processes is
important in other societal arenas as
well, such as education, medicine, soci-
ology, and other applied ﬁelds including
agriculture, pharmacology, and bio-
technology. The ramiﬁcations of evolu-
tionary thought extend into learned
realms traditionally reserved for philos-
ophy and religion. The central goal of
the “In the Light of Evolution” series is
to promote the evolutionary sciences
through state of the art colloquia and
their published proceedings. Each in-
stallment will explore evolutionary per-
spectives on a particular biological topic
that is scientiﬁcally intriguing but also
has special relevance to contemporary
societal issues or challenges. Individually
and collectively, the “In the Light of
Evolution” series will aim to interpret
phenomena in various areas of biology
through the lens of evolution, address
some of the most intellectually engaging
as well as pragmatically important
societal issues of our times, and foster
a greater appreciation of evolutionary
biology as a consolidating foundation for
the life sciences.
10788 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1100289108 Strassmann et al.
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However, this work does not tell us how
natural these events are; for that ex-
planation, we must turn to natural varia-
tion in wild fruiting bodies. Kraemer and
Velicer (26) explore natural phenotypic
variation in social traits of distinct clones
within a fruiting body. They took 10
fruiting bodies from nature, and from
them, they isolated 48 individual clones
and examined their social phenotypes
(26). These clones varied within fruiting
bodies in swarming and spore production,
genetic traits likely to have arisen recently,
because the clones from the same fruit-
ing body were nearly genetically identical.
This fascinating work will shed light on
the nature of sociality in the absence of
a single cell bottleneck, where variations
that beneﬁt single clones within the group
can spread, even at the cost of other
group members.
One advantage to studying microbial
social systems is that attributes that are
strong but sometimes hard to measure in
animals are easily examined in experi-
mental systems. One such attribute can
be called restraint. It may not be easy to
determine whether a cow in a herd is
eating all that it could or is holding back so
that others may eat. If it were holding
back, this would be a social trait that
would beneﬁt others and thus, would be
expected to evolve under kin selection
only if the genes for that trait are also
present in others (and they beneﬁt ac-
cordingly). In an experiment, Nahum et al.
(27) look at the evolution of restraint in
a nontransitive hierarchy often described
by the rock–paper–scissors game in which
no one type consistently dominates. They
used Escherichia coli clones and the
colicin system (28). Colicins are costly to
produce and resist, but sensitive strains are
killed when producers release them. The
researchers engineered double colicin
producers and resisters so that produc-
tion and resistance would not be lost or
gained in their system, and then, they
asked how the three types of clone would
fare under different migration schemes
compared with how the resistor performed
on its own. They found that the resistor
strain exhibited the most restraint with
restricted migration in the presence
of all three strains, just the conditions
where their models expect cooperation
to evolve (28).
Cooperation among clone mates arises
easily, because the genes underlying co-
operation are present in both partners. In
microbes, cooperation often takes the form
of extracellular secretions, including those
used for quorum sensing, iron scavenging,
and fruiting body formation. Therefore,
a key question involves what favors the
formation of clonal patches such that co-
operation can be favored. One answer
involves the physical structure of the envi-
ronment. For example, microorganisms
growing on substrates are more likely to be
in contact with clone mates than those liv-
ing in a more ﬂuid environment. Another
possibility, and one investigated in the
models presented by Mitri et al. (29), is that
other species can generate structure that
favors within-species clonality. This paper
uses a modeling approach to understand
how additional species can change inter-
actions within species for the case of a
growth-promoting secretion (29). This
agent-based modeling approach uses one
other species to stand in for all competing
species. The models indicate that other
species can insulate secretors from selﬁsh
nonsecretors, even when the other species
can use the secretions themselves. Other
factors such as the role of dispersal and
nutrient levels are also addressed in these
models, which represent a beginning to the
important task of considering microbial
sociality and ecology simultaneously, be-
cause these factors must inﬂuence how se-
lection operate on these systems in nature.
Real Selﬁsh (and Cooperative) Genes
It is remarkable that a ﬁeld founded on the
concept of selﬁsh genes (30) got so far for
so long without paying much attention to
speciﬁable genes. This fact is probably
because we learned how phenotypic strat-
egies of cooperation and conﬂict could be
understood as the results of genes maxi-
mizing inclusive ﬁtness. However, studies
at the genetic level are now becoming
common and should shed light both on the
mechanisms and the manner in which so-
cial selection operates.
Fischman et al. (31) review and extend
what is known about the molecular genetic
mechanisms of eusociality. Some of the
information comes from studies of partic-
ular genes and pathways, but much is now
coming from evolutionary analyses of ge-
nome-scale data. To the seven sequenced
genomes of social insects, Fischman et al.
(31) add their own transcriptome-based
protein-coding sequences for 10 social and
nonsocial bee species, representing three
origins of sociality. Some of the patterns
are idiosyncratic. For example, early re-
sults from the honey bee genome pointed
to the importance of odorant receptors
and immunity genes, but this importance
does not hold up in the broader analyses.
Findings include increased rates of evolu-
tion of brain-related genes in the primi-
tively eusocial bees, conceivably because
of the increased cognitive demands of
their competitive social environment.
Juvenile hormone and insulin are often
important in caste. This is not surprising
if caste is nutritionally based, although
the effects of juvenile hormone are quite
different from the effects in nonsocial
insects. There is also a rapid evolutionary
change in proteins involved in fundamen-
tal carbohydrate metabolism. Again, this
ﬁts with a nutritional basis for caste, but
it seems surprising that changes are com-
mon in such basic pathways. These issues
should be clariﬁed with additional genome
sequences and functional studies of in-
dividual species.
Strassmann and Queller (32) explore
a microbial social system where it is possi-
ble to manipulate genes. In the social
amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, starved
cells come together in large groups in which
20% of the cells sacriﬁce themselves to
make a stalk that aids in dispersal of the
others as spores (33). Besides this impres-
sive altruism, this species has been shown to
have cheating, kin recognition, and even
primitive farming of their bacterial food.
Numerous genes of many functional types
can be mutated to cheaters. Some cheaters
could destroy cooperation, but coopera-
tion is maintained for a variety of reasons,
one being the rather high genetic re-
latedness in the ﬁeld, part of which is
caused by kin recognition mediated by
highly polymorphic adhesion genes. Other
controls on cheating that have been shown
include the evolution of resistor genes,
power asymmetries, and lottery-like mech-
anisms. Studies of the dimA and csaA genes
have shown that cheating can also be con-
trolled by idiosyncratic pleiotropies of par-
ticular genes. The cheating allele would be
favored by selection, but other deleterious
effects of the same allele keep it from
spreading, suggesting that cheat-proof co-
operation often may be built using elements
that are essential for other reasons. Con-
sistent with ongoing social conﬂicts and
arms races, social genes evolve rapidly.
Dawkins (30) argued that all genes are
selﬁsh, but the ones that show the trait
most distinctively are selﬁsh genetic ele-
ments. These are the renegades of the
genome, chunks of DNA that replicate, in
part at least, through different pathways
than most genes and thus, can be selected
to conﬂict with other loci. Transposons,
for example, increase their representation
by jumping from one place to another,
often at some cost to the organism. Other
examples include meiotic drive elements,
various modiﬁcation rescue systems,
imprinted genes, B chromosomes, and
organellar genes. Werren (34) tackles the
issues of the function and adaptation of
these elements. He surveys the evidence,
sometimes strong and sometimes sugges-
tive, that such elements have had impor-
tant functional consequences for their
genomes. For example, parts of trans-
posons sometimes evolve into regulatory
regions, and defenses against selﬁsh ele-
ments may have led to the eukaryotic in-
tron-splicing apparatus. However, contrary
to some recent suggestions, Werren (34)
argues that there is as yet little evidence
that these are the adaptive reasons for the
Strassmann et al. PNAS | June 28, 2011 | vol. 108 | suppl. 2 | 10789
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maintenance of these elements. Instead,
selﬁsh genetic elements are maintained by
their selﬁsh behavior, but the new chunks
of DNA that they sprinkle throughout
genomes sometimes get co-opted, domes-
ticated, or otherwise modiﬁed to cause
some beneﬁcial effect to the organism.
Sociality and Medicine
Most biologists probably work in bio-
medical ﬁelds. If nothing in biology makes
sense except in the light of evolution,
then medicine should have much to learn
from evolutionary reasoning. The rapidly
growing ﬁeld of Darwinian medicine (35)
is based on this premise and seeks to
provide insight on topics like the evolution
of virulence and diseases of altered evo-
lutionary environments. A subﬁeld, re-
cently called Hamiltonian medicine (14),
investigates the impact of social evolution,
cooperation, and conﬂict on disease.
Read et al. (36) treat the vital problem
of how to minimize the evolution of
pathogen resistance and thereby extend
the useful lives of our arsenal of antibiotic
drugs. This involves a complex set of in-
teracting causes, some of which have a so-
cial element and others do not. Read et al.
(36) challenge the dogma that we mini-
mize the evolution of resistance by radical
pathogen cure: using enough of a drug to
try to eliminate the pathogen from the
patient’s body. The reasonable rationale
behind this practice is to lower the path-
ogen population size and minimize the
occurrence of novel resistance mutations.
However, Read et al. (36) argue that this
ignores the selective phase, which may
be more important in determining the
time to drug impotence, particularly when
resistance mutations arise with relatively
ease. In this selective phase, the radical
pathogen cure provides the strongest pos-
sible selection for resistance. According
to Read et al. (36), the social structure of
the pathogen can powerfully augment this
selection. When a host is infected by
multiple strains of the pathogen (as is
often true of malaria) and the total density
of the pathogen is regulated, then wiping
out susceptible strains with antibiotics
can greatly increase the frequency of for-
merly rare resistant strains. This raises
the possibility that the medical community
is ignoring an important human social
dilemma: that the best treatment for a
patient may not be the best outcome for
society as a whole.
Some human disorders can spring not
from a failure of adaptation per se but
from disagreement and conﬂict over
what is the correct adaptation. This is
particularly so in the realm of human
interpersonal relations, starting with fun-
damental conﬂicts between parent and
offspring. Haig (37) has argued that such
conﬂicts can lead to pathologies in preg-
nancy when there is an upset in the pre-
carious resolution of embryo–maternal
conﬂict. Taking a radical step further, he-
has pointed out that the optimal strategy
of an embryo’s gene differs according
to whether it came from the dam or the
sire, with maternal loci being less selected
to take resources from the mother. Re-
markably, imprinted genes seem to behave
in accord with this theory. Haig (38) ex-
tends this thinking in several directions.
He notes that most of our kin belong to
categories that have asymmetrical re-
latedness to our maternal and paternal
genes, and therefore, most of our psycho-
logical adaptations for dealing with kin,
and perhaps pathologies, may reﬂect these
kinds of conﬂicts. In particular, he shows
how this perspective may illuminate un-
solved problems surrounding the evolution
of adolescence and the timing of sexual
maturation in humans (38).
Frank and Crespi (39) extend and gen-
eralize the same theme: that conﬂict can
lead to pathologies when opposing inter-
ests that are precariously balanced become
unbalanced. Frank and Crespi (39) suggest
that the conﬂict between maternal and
paternal genes in offspring, through its
shown effects on the regulation and pa-
thologies of growth, may be responsible
for some cancers. They then discuss the
exciting idea that this same balance is
partly responsible for a wide spectrum
of psychiatric disorders, such as autism,
that may result from an overexpression
of paternal interests in offspring self-
ishness. Similarly, other disorders such as
schizophrenia might result from an over-
expression of genes underlying the mater-
nal goal of greater social integration.
Finally, Frank and Crespi (39) present
a theory of conﬂict between autosomal
and X chromosomes. X chromosomes
spend two-thirds of their time in females
and therefore, should be selected to give
greater weight to female than male adap-
tation. Autosomes should give equal
weight. It will be fascinating to see if em-
pirical tests support the authors’ pre-
diction that such conﬂict will underlie
pathologies of expression along the male–
female axis.
Are Humans Different?
Evolutionary principles for cooperation
that have been developed from studies of
diverse social organisms should apply to
humans. The more immediate roots to
human cooperation and conﬂict also may
be seen in primates. However, there are
challenges in studying humans and their
close relatives. Objectivity is essential.
There are many possibilities for study
techniques (such as the questionnaire or
survey) in humans, but these also offer
many opportunities for confusion. One
powerful approach to studying human co-
operation is to look at what humans do
and what the outcomes are, just as one
might do for other social animals. This
technique can be particularly informative
when the human group lives in ways con-
sistent with humans over most of their
evolutionary past. The Dogon of Mali,
reported on by Strassmann (40), are millet
and onion farming agriculturalists who do
not use contraception, adhere largely to
indigenous religions, practice polygyny,
and have high mortality rates. In a 25-y
longitudinal study, Strassmann (40) ad-
dresses the hypothesis that the Dogon
are cooperative breeders, where some
individuals help rear nondescendent kin
rather than their own progeny. She does
not ﬁnd that the data support this hy-
pothesis. First, neither women nor men
delay reproduction in order to raise sib-
lings. Although parents force daughters to
care for extra siblings, this is better viewed
as parental manipulation. as the presence
of siblings reduces survivorship. Similarly,
grandmothers do not appear to be effec-
tive alloparents. Rather than increasing
survivorship, the presence of paternal
grandmothers does the opposite, doubling
the hazard of death for a child. What
matters most for survival is the presence of
the mother, and other relatives are not
adequate replacements. Task cooperation
occurs within the groups that work and
eat together, but conﬂict is always present
in ways that are carefully explained by
Strassmann (40).
In an overview of vertebrate inter-
actions, Cheney (41) shows that animals
ranging from chickadees to chimpanzees
are aware of their own status and their
companions, and they behave accordingly.
Eavesdropping on how individuals interact
with others can change behaviors. Rela-
tednesses are often known and impact
interactions. In vervet monkeys, for
example, an individual who has been
attacked may turn and subsequently attack
a relative of her opponent. Dominance
hierarchies also impact such interactions.
However, some animal interactions are
more subtle. Ravens are more likely to
cache food in hidden sites when com-
petitors are present, for example. How-
ever, the calculations of gain, cost, and
punishment necessary for reciprocal al-
truism (here called contingent altruism)
seem largely lacking outside of humans.
Instead, there is a great deal of tolerance
in interactions and a lack of direct payback
among close relatives and long-time
partners. However, it is in these relation-
ships where cooperation overwhelmingly
occurs. A common feature of cooperative
acts is that they are not necessarily tran-
sitive. Some individuals consistently take
on the risky jobs, be it male chimps pa-
trolling their territorial edges or female
lions leading the hunt. This is also true
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in organisms (such as wasps) with much
simpler brains, where cooperation ﬂows
from workers to the queen.
Observations of humans and primates
in natural situations can teach us much
about behavior, but environmental com-
plexity can make causation difﬁcult to
discern. An alternative is to examine
choices made under highly regulated cir-
cumstances. To address social acts such as
generosity, trust, fairness, and punishment,
many purportedly relevant games have
been applied to humans, one simple ex-
ample being the Dictator Game that al-
lows a subject to decide whether to share
a quantiﬁable resource with an unseen
other (this game typically yields donations
of 20–30% of the resource). Although
such games have weaknesses, they seem to
indicate that humans are willing to donate
but only at levels indicating that they
consistently value themselves most highly.
These and other experiments further in-
dicate that humans favor relatives, long-
term partners, and group members over
outsiders, and they will suffer costs to
punish cheaters. As described by Silk
and House (42), versions of social games
involving food or tools that likewise
have been used with primates produce
complex results. Cooperation clearly
occurs and tracks levels of sociality in
the groups, but some results are contro-
versial and remain open to alternative
interpretations.
In the modern world, most of a
person’s material possessions are items
that no individual could possibly make by
herself. Instead they were produced with
the learned and specialized expertise
of others. In the ﬁnal paper of these pro-
ceedings, Boyd et al. (43) argue that
learning from others (and not intelligence
alone) is the key to human success, the
characteristic that has made us so adapt-
able. Initially in human history, these
adaptations involved direct protection
from the climate, food acquisition, and
food storage. Thus, it is a particular kind
of intelligence that involves the sharing
and acquiring of information from others.
These cultural learners have an advan-
tage, because they can grasp the best from
the past even if they innovate personally
only occasionally. Tools and customs
certainly make life for humans easier
or possible.
The study of cooperation and conﬂict
has come a very long way from the time,
50 years ago, when Hamilton (6,7) ﬁrst
pondered how to explain the evolution
of worker behavior in social insects with
a strange genetic system. It has spread
out taxonomically, extending even to mi-
crobes. It has deepened mechanistically as
we probe its molecular and genetic basis.
It is beginning to show practical applica-
tions, as in medicine. Additionally, it
has proven essential for understanding
the structure of life from cells to multi-
cellular organisms to societies. Finally,
its study helps us to understand the mix
of cooperation and conﬂict that makes
the human animal both ordinary and
remarkable.
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